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Note 
 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism: Bringing 
Temporary Treasury Regulations Back in Line 
with the APA 
Eleanor D. Wood* 
―Under general administrative law doctrines, it would 
seem unimaginable that the IRS could bypass notice-and-
comment procedures, offer no required ‗good cause‘ explanation, 
promise to take comments into account but ignore them and 
then, more than a decade later, adversely invoke its temporary 
regulation against a taxpayer.‖1 Such action might seem on its 
face to be unimaginable, but this exact situation was recently 
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2 At is-
sue was whether a temporary Treasury regulation3 promulgat-
ed without following the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
informal rulemaking requirements4 and left on the books for 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
Gustavus Adolphus College. Thank you to Professor Kristin Hickman for her 
guidance and encouragement in writing this Note. Additional thanks to the 
editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their comments and cri-
tiques. Finally, thank you to my family for never ceasing to be my number one 
fan club. Copyright © 2015 by Eleanor D. Wood.  
 1. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, Petaluma FX Partners, L.L.C. v. 
Comm‘r, No. 12-1364, slip op. (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2015), 2014 WL 2601469, at 
*18–19. 
 2. Petaluma FX Partners, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, No. 12-1364, slip op. (D.C. 
Cir. June 26, 2015), was decided by the D.C. Circuit on June 26, 2015. The Re-
placement Brief for the Appellant was filed May 12, 2014. The Replacement 
Brief for the Appellee was filed June 10, 2014, and the Replacement Reply 
Brief for the Appellant was filed July 10, 2014. Oral arguments took place on 
November 18, 2014. 
 3. The temporary regulation in question is Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6233-
1T (1999). Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 6. For the pub-
lication of this rule, see Miscellaneous Provisions Related to the Tax Treat-
ment of Partnership Items, 52 Fed. Reg. 6779 (proposed March 5, 1987). 
 4. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (requir-
ing ―notice of proposed rulemaking‖ and ―an opportunity to participate in the 
rule making‖). 
WOOD_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:55 PM 
840 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:839 
 
over fourteen years should be binding on a taxpayer.5 History 
seems to imply, perhaps surprisingly, that the answer to this 
question has always been yes,6 but should that continue to be 
the case?  
The Treasury Department (Treasury) has broad general 
rulemaking power7 and has historically used this power to cre-
ate new regulations promulgated under APA notice-and-
comment procedures.8 However, out of supposed necessity, in 
the 1980s the Treasury began increasingly using temporary 
regulations, which follow no such promulgation procedure, yet 
have the force of law when published.9 While Congress statuto-
rily recognized10 the use of temporary regulations with the pas-
sage of 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e),11 it also expressed concerns12 about 
regulations that might become ―permanently temporary‖13 and 
tacked on a three-year sunset provision.14 However, the provi-
sion was not given retroactive application, effectively grandfa-
thering in all temporary regulations issued prior to its enact-
ment.15 
Few cases have challenged Treasury non-compliance with 
the APA, but the problem is getting harder to ignore. Courts 
 
 5. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 7, 9. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia avoided this issue by holding that a later- 
enacted final regulation, Treas. Reg. § 301.6233-1 (2001), was applicable to the 
case, making the validity of the temporary regulation in question irrelevant. 
See Petaluma, slip op. at 13–15. 
 6. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 15 (―We have not 
found any case where a court has invalidated a temporary regulation for the 
IRS‘s failure to follow the dictates of the APA . . . .‖).  
 7. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012) (giving the Treasury the power to ―pre-
scribe all needful rules and regulations . . . in relation to internal revenue‖). 
 8. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Tempo-
rary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 343 (1991). 
 9. Id. 
 10. For a discussion of what Congress actually meant by the passage of  
§ 7805(e), see infra Part II.C. 
 11. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e). 
 12. Compare S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 7 (1988) (proposing, initially, a two-
year limitation), with H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 217–18 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) 
(settling on a three-year limitation). 
 13. See Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary 
Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legis-
lative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX 
L.J. 248, 254 (2003). 
 14. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e)(2).  
 15. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, § 6232(b), 102 Stat. 3734, 3735 (1988) (applying the three-year expiration 
date only to regulations issued after the enactment of the Act). 
WOOD_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:55 PM 
2015] REJECTING TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 841 
 
have started hinting that such procedural failings might inval-
idate a temporary regulation.16 In the past five years, courts 
have also definitively held that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) is subject to the APA17 and expressly rejected the idea of 
tax exceptionalism—the belief that tax is special, or more spe-
cifically, that in law, tax should be given special treatment.18 
Defenders of temporary regulations have, therefore, turned to 
new arguments, claiming that such regulations are exempt 
from procedural requirements for good cause,19 because they 
are interpretive rules,20 or because § 7805 trumps the APA.21 
Each of these arguments can be refuted, especially as they ap-
ply to grandfathered temporary Treasury regulations. 
This Note argues that the IRS should no longer be able to 
treat temporary Treasury regulations as legally binding on 
taxpayers if they were promulgated in violation of the APA, but 
it recognizes that invalidating all temporary regulations over-
night would cause more problems than it solves. Part I of this 
Note describes the historical development of temporary regula-
 
 16. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011) (stat-
ing that allowing notice and comment after a temporary regulation was enact-
ed was ―not an acceptable substitute for pre-promulgation notice and com-
ment‖); Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 491 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (―No 
explanation has been forthcoming from the government as to why such a ‗tem-
porary regulation,‘ issued in 1987 shortly after enactment of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, should remain ‗temporary‘ well over a decade later . . . .‖); Kikalos 
v. Comm‘r, 190 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that because it has not 
been subjected to procedural scrutiny, a temporary regulation may be ―entitled 
to no more deference than a proposed regulation‖); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of 
Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 245–48 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 
650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (Halpern & 
Holmes, JJ., concurring) (arguing that temporary Treasury regulations are not 
―special‖ and should be subject to the APA‘s procedural requirements). 
 17. See Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
 18. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 
U.S. 44, 56 (2011) (―We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should 
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as 
our review of other regulations.‖); infra Part I.C. 
 19. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012) (providing an exception to the APA‘s 
notice-and-comment procedures required for rule making when an agency ―for 
good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impractica-
ble, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest‖). 
 20. See id. § 553(b)(A) (providing an exception to the APA‘s notice-and-
comment procedures required for interpretive rules). 
 21. See Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in the Tax 
Law, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1011, 1051 n.194 (2010) [hereinafter Legislative En-
trenchment] (―[T]he IRS has frequently argued that § 7805(e) excuses the 
Treasury from the APA‘s notice-and-comment requirements when it issues 
temporary regulations.‖). 
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tions, the movement away from tax exceptionalism, and the in-
creasing interplay between administrative and tax law. Part II 
examines the arguments defending and condemning the validi-
ty of temporary Treasury regulations and how the Mayo22 deci-
sion has further complicated the debate. Finally, Part III ad-
dresses potential solutions for bringing the Treasury back in 
line with the APA without destabilizing the tax system. This 
Note maintains that the Supreme Court‘s explicit rejection of 
tax exceptionalism creates considerable doubt about the en-
forceability of temporary Treasury regulations promulgated in 
violation of the APA. Therefore, this Note proposes several ju-
dicial and legislative actions that could be taken to correct the 
procedural invalidity of temporary regulations and to make fu-
ture Treasury promulgation policy administratively acceptable. 
I.  UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE VALIDITY OF 
TEMPORARY TREASURY REGULATIONS   
Although temporary regulations have been used by the 
Treasury for more than thirty years, only recently has their va-
lidity been cast into doubt. This Part outlines the development 
and current status of temporary Treasury regulations. Section 
A provides background on why temporary regulations came in-
to existence. Section B discusses the procedural requirements 
imposed by the APA on all agencies engaging in rulemaking ac-
tivities. Section C explains the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Mayo to reject tax exceptionalism. Finally, Section D summa-
rizes current scholarly, judicial, and Treasury views on tempo-
rary regulations.  
A. THE RISE OF THE TEMPORARY TREASURY REGULATION 
The use of temporary Treasury regulations increased dra-
matically starting in the 1980s, when the Treasury was strug-
gling to provide timely guidance on new and complex tax 
laws,23 especially in the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.24 
By 1988, the practice had caught the attention of Congress.25 
Recognizing that ―[g]enerally, temporary regulations are effec-
 
 22. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 44. For more information on Mayo, see infra Part 
I.C. 
 23. See Asimow, supra note 8. 
 24. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 
2085 (1986) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (making significant 
changes to the tax code). 
 25. S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 7 (1988) (―The IRS also issues some regula-
tions as temporary regulations.‖). 
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tive immediately upon publication and remain in effect until 
replaced by final regulations,‖ the Senate expressed concern 
―about the length of time that some regulations remain in tem-
porary form.‖26 Responding to these concerns, Congress enacted 
26 U.S.C. § 7805(e),27 which requires that all temporary regula-
tions be simultaneously issued in proposed form and which sets 
a three-year expiration period.28 The statute, however, was not 
given retroactive application and, therefore, only applies to 
temporary regulations issued after November 20, 1988.29 
The IRS has taken the position that temporary regulations 
issued prior to that date, which in this Note shall be referred to 
as grandfathered temporary regulations,30 technically never 
expire.31 Generally, courts have agreed that in limiting the ef-
fective date of the sunset provision of § 7805(e)(2) Congress ex-
empted all regulations already on the books at that time from 
mandatory expiration.32 While temporary regulations issued 
today are binding on taxpayers for no more than three years 
unless properly promulgated into final regulations, some 
grandfathered temporary regulations have arguably had the 
force of law for over twenty-five years.33 
B. INFORMAL RULEMAKING PROCEDURE AND EXCEPTIONS 
The Treasury‘s power to issue regulations, like that of any 
other agency engaging in rulemaking, is based on a statutory 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-647, § 6232(b), 102 Stat. 3734, 3734 (1988). 
 28. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 29. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 § 6232(b); see Lysz-
kowski v. Comm‘r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2751, at 2759 n.2 (1995) (―Sec. 7805(e) 
applies to temporary regulations issued after the date which is 10 days after 
the date of enactment of [the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 
1988, which was enacted on] . . . Nov. 10, 1988.‖). 
 30. Some other scholars cleverly refer to such regulations as ―permanently 
temporary.‖ See Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 13.  
 31. See Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 21, at 1053–54.  
 32. See, e.g., Garnett v. Comm‘r, 132 T.C. 368, 372 n.11 (2009) (noting 
that the temporary regulations at issue in the case were more than three 
years old but still in force because ―[t]he temporary regulations involved here-
in [Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T] were issued Feb. 19, 1988, before the effec-
tive date of sec. 7805(e)‖). 
 33. See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T (1987) (regulating personal in-
terest); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T (1984) (regulating alimony and separate 
maintenance payments). For a discussion on whether temporary regulations 
carry the force of law, see Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013) [hereinafter Force of Law].  
WOOD_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:55 PM 
844 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:839 
 
delegation of power from Congress. While numerous provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or the Code) provide specific 
authority,34 the Secretary of the Treasury has also been en-
dowed with the general authority to ―prescribe all needful rules 
and regulations for the enforcement‖ of the IRC.35 However, 
with such power comes the responsibility to abide by the proce-
dural requirements imposed by APA § 553.36  
For informal rulemaking, the APA requires that an agency 
publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register detailing the time, place, and nature of the public pro-
ceedings; referencing the relevant legal authority invoked; and 
providing a description of the issue.37 An agency must then 
provide sufficient time, generally thirty to ninety days, to ―give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate‖ by submitting 
written comments.38 After considering and addressing all sig-
nificant comments, an agency can issue final regulations with 
legally binding force, provided they incorporate a ―concise gen-
eral statement of [the regulations‘] basis and purpose.‖39 The 
final regulations can then become effective no sooner than thir-
ty days after publication.40 Thus, the APA mandated process is 
publication of non-binding proposed regulations, acceptance of 
public comment, and then, but only then, promulgation of a fi-
nal binding regulation.  
The requirements of APA § 553 are ―[k]nown collectively as 
notice-and-comment rulemaking‖ and must be utilized unless 
one of the predefined exceptions apply.41 Generally, interpre-
tive rules, procedural rules, and statements of policy are ex-
empt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.42 The APA, how-
 
 34. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining 
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemak-
ing Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1735 (2007) [hereinafter APA 
Rulemaking] (―In fact, the I.R.C. contains several hundred specific authority 
grants.‖). 
 35. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
 36. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2012).  
 37. See id. § 553(b). 
 38. Id. § 553(c); see also APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1732–33; The 
Federal Register Tutorial, FED. REG., http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 
tutorial/online-html.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (stating that the notice-
and-comment comment period ―usually runs 30, 60 or 90 days from date of 
publication‖). 
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 40. See id. § 553(d). 
 41. APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1734. 
 42. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
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ever, does not define ―interpretive,‖ ―procedural,‖ or ―policy 
statement,‖ so such rules are hard to distinguish from legisla-
tive or substantive rules, which must be properly promulgat-
ed.43 Similarly exempt are rules for which the agency can prove 
it had good cause to bypass any or all of the APA § 553 re-
quirements because such procedures were ―impracticable, un-
necessary, or contrary to the public interest.‖44 However, to in-
voke the good cause exemption, an agency must justify its claim 
with specificity and particularity.45 
C. MAYO AND THE DOWNFALL OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
For years scholars have believed in the idea of tax excep-
tionalism—that, for one reason or another, tax is special in the 
eyes of the law.46 Some commentators hold this belief because 
of the tax system‘s inherent complexities,47 arguing that courts 
are ill prepared to deal with tax controversies, so deference 
should be given to the Tax Court or agency experts.48 Others 
focus on the importance of tax revenue to the government‘s 
ability to function49 or on the fact that tax ―touches human ac-
tivities at so many points.‖50 
 
 43. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 
1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (detailing a four-part test to distinguish between 
interpretive and legislative rules); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 
943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (laying out a two-part test to distinguish between 
policy statements and legislative rules). 
 44. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). 
 45. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1780. 
 46. See Gene Magidenko, Tax Exceptionalism: Wanted Dead or Alive, 1 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 26, 27 (2011) (noting that, historically, Treasury regula-
tions were evaluated under a different standard than regulations promulgated 
by other agencies). 
 47. See Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1897, 1903 (2014); see also id. at 1907 (―Albert Einstein is frequent-
ly quoted—including on the IRS website—as having said, ‗The hardest thing 
in the world to understand is the income tax.‘‖ (citing Tax Quotes, IRS, http:// 
www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes (last visited Nov. 2, 2015))). 
 48. Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 1625, 1629 (2014) (―Although federal appellate courts usually review legal 
questions decided by a trial court de novo, the Supreme Court, in Dobson v. 
Commissioner, granted deference to the Tax Court on questions of tax law.‖). 
 49. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exception-
alism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1596 (2006) [hereinafter 
Need for Mead] (―The primary function of Treasury tax personnel and the IRS 
is to collect government revenues . . . .‖); Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to 
Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558, 
1567 (2011) (―Due to the importance of collecting revenue for the government, 
[the IRS and Treasury] have extensive power and discretion relative to other 
federal agencies.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 
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Whatever the reason, attitudes toward tax exceptionalism 
have begun to change. Scholars are now questioning whether 
tax is really unique and whether special treatment is actually 
warranted.51 However, the Supreme Court has already taken a 
stance against special treatment. In its 2011 case Mayo Foun-
dation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, 
the Court was asked to determine what level of deference 
should be given to a Treasury regulation that implicitly made 
the wages earned by medical residents subject to Federal In-
surance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes.52 The Court unani-
mously53 held that it could find no ―justification for applying a 
less deferential standard of review to Treasury Department 
regulations than we apply to the rules of any other agency‖ and 
that ―[i]n the absence of such justification, we are not inclined 
to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax 
law only.‖54 It could be argued that all Mayo stands for is the 
fact that Treasury rules and regulations are now subject to 
Chevron deference,55 but most in the tax community have taken 
it to mean more—that the Supreme Court has decidedly reject-
ed the idea of tax exceptionalism.56  
 
247, 259 (1935) (―[T]axes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt 
and certain availability an imperious need.‖); Tax Quotes, supra note 47 (―‗The 
power of taxing people and their property is essential to the very existence of 
government.‘ — James Madison, U.S. President.‖). 
 50. Dobson v. Comm‘r, 320 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1943); see Steve R. Johnson, 
Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 
269, 271 (2012) (―In its impact on our lives, the tax law is the single greatest 
medium of interface between our government and our citizens.‖). 
 51. See Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1835, 1879–80 (2014). See generally Need for Mead, supra note 49 
(arguing that Treasury interpretations should not be given special judicial 
deference). 
 52. 562 U.S. 44, 51 (2011). 
 53. The case was actually decided 8-0 as Justice Kagan took no part in the 
consideration or decision. Id. at 60.  
 54. Id. at 55.  
 55. Chevron deference is the standard of judicial review established in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. It requires a 
court to defer to an agency‘s interpretation of a statute if ―the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue‖ and ―the agency‘s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.‖ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Nat‘l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 56. See Niki R. Ford, Easy on the MAYO Please: Why Judicial Deference 
Should Not Be Extended to Regulations that Violate the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 799, 826 (2012) (describing the decision in Mayo as 
―a devastating blow to the tax exceptionalists‖). 
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D. THE CURRENT STATUS OF TEMPORARY TREASURY  
REGULATIONS 
Views on temporary regulations are shifting in the wake of 
Mayo, so this Section outlines the current arguments and posi-
tions of scholars, courts, and the Treasury. Subsection 1 dis-
cusses the present judicial acceptance of temporary regulations, 
but also summarizes recent opinions reflecting the courts‘ in-
creasing skepticism. Subsection 2 then explains the Treasury‘s 
current practices and its modern approach to defending the va-
lidity of temporary regulations. 
 1. Judicial Reactions to Temporary Regulations 
Even before Mayo scholars were growing skeptical of the 
validity of temporary regulations. Michael Asimow raised the 
issue as early as 1991, questioning whether the ―frequent use of 
temporary regulations is good policy.‖57 Courts, however, have 
been slower to follow suit. In 1999, the validity of Temporary 
Treasury Regulation § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), which stated that 
the interest on underpayments of tax was personal interest and 
not deductible by a taxpayer, was brought before the Seventh 
Circuit.58 Although the court decided the case on other grounds, 
it noted that the seemingly permanent nature of the temporary 
regulation at issue was an interesting ―wrinkle‖ in the case.59 
The court also hinted that if either party had questioned the 
temporary regulation, the court might have been inclined to 
hold that it was ―entitled to no more deference than a proposed 
regulation.‖60 The following year, the Ninth Circuit was faced 
with a similar question and merely footnoted that ―[n]o expla-
nation has been forthcoming from the government as to why 
such a ‗temporary regulation,‘ issued in 1987 shortly after en-
actment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, should remain ‗tempo-
rary‘ well over a decade later.‖61 
More recently, in 2010, the Tax Court found that Tempo-
rary Treasury Regulations §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T and 
301.6501(e)-1T were invalid and ―not entitled to deferential 
 
 57. Asimow, supra note 8, at 343. 
 58. Kikalos v. Comm‘r, 190 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 59. Id. at 795. The court questioned the temporariness of the regulation 
as it had been on the books since 1987, and the court could find no evidence 
that it had been through notice-and-comment procedures in the twelve-year 
period between promulgation and the decision. Id. at 795–96. 
 60. Id. at 796. 
 61. Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 491 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000). 
WOOD_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:55 PM 
848 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:839 
 
treatment.‖62 The majority held the temporary regulations in-
valid because they were ―unambiguously in conflict with the 
statute.‖63 Taking a different view, and only concurring in the 
result, Judges Halpern and Holmes held that the regulations 
were ―procedurally invalid under the Administrative Procedure 
Act‖ because they were legislative in nature, but did not go 
through the notice-and-comment process, nor did the Treasury 
properly invoke an exception from APA procedure.64 Additional-
ly, the concurrence specifically rejected the idea that § 7805(e) 
is in conflict with the APA and, therefore, Congress implicitly 
meant to waive the notice-and-comment requirement for all 
temporary regulations.65 
If the validity of temporary regulations is a functional ar-
gument, why are there so few cases raising it? Some commen-
tators have argued that lawyers simply do not know that the 
argument is out there,66 or that taxpayers have little to gain 
from a procedural challenge.67 Others have pointed out that 
even if a court believed a temporary regulation was procedural-
ly invalid, a taxpayer may still lose their case because of the 
harmless error rule.68 Whatever the reason, scholars have 
started pointing out cases where the validity of the temporary 
regulation at issue likely should have been raised. For example, 
Professor Andy Grewal69 argued that in United States v. Woods 
the parties could have questioned the Court‘s subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case, because such jurisdiction rested 
solely on a temporary regulation issued in 1987 and not final-
ized until after the taxpayer‘s transaction more than twelve 
 
 62. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 224 
(2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. 
Ct. 2120 (2012). 
 63. Id. at 227 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 238–39. 
 65. Id. at 245–46. 
 66. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treas-
ury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Re-
quirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2008) [hereinafter Problem of 
Remedy] (―Maybe tax lawyers are simply unaware of the procedural argu-
ments available. Some degree of tax community ignorance of nontax adminis-
trative law principles undoubtedly contributes to the paucity of procedural 
challenges.‖). 
 67. See id. at 1156 (―[S]tatutory and doctrinal limitations combine in the 
tax context to deter taxpayers from pursuing APA compliance claims.‖). 
 68. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1791–92. 
 69. Andy S. Grewal is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
Iowa specializing in the interaction between tax and administrative law.  
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years later.70 
2. The Treasury‘s Position on Temporary Regulations 
While courts have rarely required the IRS to defend the va-
lidity of temporary regulations, the Treasury‘s position on tem-
porary regulations can be gleaned from its practices. Even 
though the Treasury acknowledges that it is subject to the 
APA,71 it fails to use traditional APA procedures on a regular 
basis. A study conducted by Professor Kristin E. Hickman72 on 
the Treasury‘s compliance with the APA revealed that 40.9% of 
regulations issued over a three year period failed to follow the 
notice-and-comment process.73 For those issued as temporary 
regulations—36.2% of all projects—the Treasury claimed that 
APA § 553 did not apply 96.43% of the time.74 Although the 
Treasury occasionally bases its claim on the good cause excep-
tion,75 its default inapplicability argument appears to be that 
temporary Treasury regulations are interpretive.76 
The Internal Revenue Manual actually explains that the 
―[Internal Revenue] Service will generally rely on the necessity 
of immediate guidance as good cause‖ and prescribes language 
that should be included in the preamble of any regulation 
claiming such exemption.77 Similarly, the IRS takes the posi-
tion that ―most IRS/Treasury regulations will be interpretative 
regulations because they fill gaps in legislation or have a prior 
existence in the law‖78 or are promulgated based on a general 
 
 70. See ANDY S. GREWAL, THE MISSED JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT IN 
―U.S. V. WOODS‖ 1 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369512. 
 71. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1729; see also Cohen v. United 
States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (exemplifying a court‘s refusal 
to shield the IRS from suits under the APA). 
 72. Kristin E. Hickman is the Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in Law at 
the University of Minnesota Law School and teaches primarily tax and admin-
istrative law as well as statutory interpretation. 
 73. APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1748 (analyzing 232 regulatory 
projects published in the Federal Register between 2003 and 2005). 
 74. Id. at 1748, 1750 tbl.2a. 
 75. See id. at 1750 tbl.2a (detailing that the good cause exception is al-
leged 17.86% of the time while no real reason is provided 78.57% of the time). 
 76. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 
§ 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-005.html 
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL] (―[M]ost IRS/Treasury regulations 
are interpretative, and therefore not subject to the notice-and-comment provi-
sions of the APA . . . .‖). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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grant of authority.79 Taking a slightly different approach, the 
Treasury has also made the broader assertion that Congress 
exempted all temporary regulations from APA requirements by 
enacting § 7805(e).80 Additionally, there has been some discus-
sion that, even if improperly promulgated, temporary regula-
tions should be given Chevron deference just like any final 
Treasury regulation.81  
Temporary regulations have become a mainstream pres-
ence in the tax world over the last thirty years and have been 
given significant deference by courts out of respect for the IRS. 
However, times are changing. The Treasury‘s arguments that 
temporary regulations are exempt from notice-and-comment 
procedures were perhaps persuasive when tax exceptionalism 
was alive and well, but in today‘s administrative law environ-
ment they leave something to be desired. What remains to be 
seen is when and how courts and the Treasury will respond. 
II.  THE TREASURY‘S DEFENSES OF PROCEDURALLY 
INVALID TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ARE 
SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED BY THE REJECTION OF 
TAX EXCEPTIONALISM   
The Treasury has successfully defended its temporary reg-
ulations using a variety of alternative arguments, but in the 
wake of Mayo these arguments may no longer be enough. This 
Part discusses how the Supreme Court‘s rejection of tax excep-
tionalism could strengthen taxpayer attacks on the validity of 
temporary regulations promulgated in violation of the APA. 
Section A analyzes why the Mayo Court was correct in refusing 
to recognize a separate standard of administrative review for 
tax purposes only. Section B then describes why APA § 553 ex-
emptions, like those for interpretive rules82 and good cause,83 
 
 79. See Force of Law, supra note 33, at 475 (―When Congress enacted the 
APA, the general consensus among courts and scholars held that the only 
rules properly characterized as legislative were those promulgated pursuant to 
a narrow and specific grant of authority to fill an explicitly identified statutory 
gap . . . .‖). 
 80. See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 
245 (2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 650 
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012). 
 81. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm‘r, 348 F.3d 136, 144 
(6th Cir. 2003) (―The fact that the temporary regulation was not subject to no-
tice and comment does not, moreover, require us to eschew Chevron deference 
. . . .‖).  
 82. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012). 
 83. See id. § 553(b)(B). 
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should generally be considered inadequate defenses to com-
plaints that the Treasury has failed to follow proper notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures. Section C argues that tempo-
rary regulations should not be upheld on the belief that Con-
gress intended § 7805(e) to trump the APA. Finally, Section D 
takes a closer look at how the above arguments apply in the 
grandfathered temporary regulation context.  
 A. MAYO WAS CORRECT TO REJECT TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
Two of the main arguments in favor of tax exceptionalism 
are that tax law is uniquely complex and that tax is special be-
cause of its relation to government funding. Although it is true 
that the tax system is complicated and that the government 
could not function without the revenue generated through taxa-
tion,84 is that enough to justify special judicial treatment for all 
questions of tax law? The Supreme Court said no,85 and was 
correct in doing so for two principal reasons.  
First, the IRC may consist of numerous, somewhat daunt-
ing volumes, but in reality it is not unique in its complexity. In 
fact, ―[i]t‘s mostly nontax people who think tax is special.‖86 
Just as tax may seem complex to nontax accountants and law-
yers, the rules surrounding the administration of social securi-
ty benefits, environmental protection regulations, or anti-trust 
laws may seem overwhelming to individuals not practicing in 
those fields. Many scholars cite complexity as the reason courts 
not specializing in tax should defer to agency expertise,87 but 
unlike other technical areas where non-legal training might be 
necessary to understand the law, interpreting the Internal 
Revenue Code rarely requires scientific expertise.88 And ―de-
spite their generalist profile, appellate courts are particularly 
adept at interpreting statutes,‖89 so it stands to reason that 
judges should be capable of tackling questions of tax law using 
the same standard of review they apply in other cases.  
 
 84. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.  
 85. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 
U.S. 44, 60 (2011). 
 86. Zelenak, supra note 47, at 1906; see also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, 
or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX 
REV. 517, 519–28 (1994) (explaining that the belief that tax is uniquely com-
plex is perpetuated by references to tax in law schools, the legal profession, 
and popular culture). 
 87. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Need for Mead, supra note 49, at 1599. 
 89. Id.  
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Second, today‘s tax system does much more than simply 
generate revenue.90 Congress frequently uses the IRC to incen-
tivize socially acceptable or desirable behavior and to deliver 
various forms of poverty relief.91 For example, the IRC permits 
a single taxpayer to exclude from her calculation of taxable in-
come up to $250,000 of gain from the sale of her principal resi-
dence if certain qualifications are met92 and to deduct interest 
on up to $1.1 million of indebtedness related to a qualified resi-
dence.93 Both of these provisions are clearly not generating rev-
enue, but, rather, were adopted to promote homeownership. 
Similarly, the IRC also contains a provision providing certain 
low income taxpayers with a dollar for dollar reduction in their 
tax liability (even below zero, resulting in a refund) based on a 
percentage of their qualifying earned income.94 This provision 
has little to do with revenue acquisition and everything to do 
with furthering the social policy in favor of providing welfare 
support to the impoverished. By recognizing that the current 
tax code governs vast topics and behaviors, not just revenue 
collection, it is easier to understand why a tax exceptionalism 
argument that focuses solely on the unique revenue generating 
aspect of tax must fail. As Professor Leslie Book95 recently 
pointed out, ―[t]he justification for [tax exceptionalism] . . . be-
comes less compelling as the Code takes on other roles beyond 
pure revenue collection.‖96 For example, why should poverty re-
 
 90. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything is Tax: Evaluating the Struc-
tural Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 67–68 
(2013) (―[T]he tax code has recently come to incorporate ‗policies aimed at the 
environment, conservation, green energy, manufacturing, innovation, educa-
tion, saving, retirement, health care, child care, welfare, corporate governance, 
export promotion, charitable giving, governance of tax exempt organizations, 
and economic development, to name a few.‘‖) (quoting Pamela F. Olson, Lau-
rence Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . . 
Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (May 6, 2010) http://law.onu.edu/ 
sites/default/ files/Olson.pdf. 
 91. See generally Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 
ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 793 (2014) (articulating how the ―war on poverty has moved 
into the tax code‖ and why the ―federal government anchors many of its anti-
poverty initiatives in the nation‘s tax code‖). 
 92. See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
 93. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (Supp. I 2013); Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 
I.R.B. 571.  
 94. This provision is known generally as the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012). 
 95. Leslie Book is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Graduate 
Tax Program at Villanova University School of Law.  
 96. Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and 
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 540 (2012). 
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lief imbedded in the tax code be given special treatment when 
poverty relief governed by other agencies is not? In carving out 
all of tax law for special treatment, tax exceptionalists ignore 
the fact that some, and in fact a significant portion, of tax law 
has nothing to do with revenue.  
B. THE TREASURY‘S UNPERSUASIVE USE OF APA EXEMPTIONS 
Understanding some of the justifications for rejecting tax 
exceptionalism helps explain why current Treasury actions of-
ten violate the APA and why the Treasury‘s arguments defend-
ing procedurally invalid temporary regulations are now unper-
suasive. The APA has exemptions to its notice-and-comment 
procedures for a reason,97 but the exemptions must be properly 
invoked. As Professor Hickman‘s study noted, a three-year 
sampling revealed that over 40% of Treasury regulations are 
noncompliant with the APA, and when issuing temporary regu-
lations the Treasury almost always claims that notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures do not apply.98 While the 
Treasury is not alone in avoiding APA informal rulemaking re-
quirements,99 such a high rate of exemption should raise red 
flags because it appears the exception has swallowed the rule.  
The Treasury‘s default response to claims that its tempo-
rary regulations deviated from proper APA procedure is usually 
to assert that the regulation is exempt either because it is in-
terpretive in nature or it qualifies under the good-cause excep-
tion.100 Many scholars have written extensively on the merits of 
these claims in general,101 but how does the analysis change in 
light of the Supreme Court‘s rejection of tax exceptionalism? 
 
 97. By exempting things like interpretive rules and regulations issued to 
correct a clerical error, the APA is recognizing that following proper notice-
and-comment procedure can be a drain on resources that is unwarranted if 
little would be gained by following such procedure. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)–(b) 
(B) (2012). 
 98. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 99. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULE-
MAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC 
COMMENTS (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf (―Agencies did 
not publish a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), enabling the public to 
comment on a proposed rule, for about 35 percent of major rules and about 44 
percent of nonmajor rules published during 2003 through 2010.‖). The GAO 
report studied the 568 major rules (those having an annual impact on the 
economy generally exceeding $100 million) and over 30,000 nonmajor rules 
published by U.S. agencies between 2003 and 2010. Id.; see also id. at 9 fig.1. 
 100. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 76, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1. 
 101. See generally Asimow, supra note 8; Problem of Remedy, supra note 
66; APA Rulemaking, supra note 34; Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 13.  
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This Section will argue that the tides have shifted in favor of 
those claiming that certain temporary regulations are proce-
durally invalid. This Section will first analyze interpretive rule 
assertions in the new post-Mayo administrative environment 
and then examine claims of good cause.  
1. Temporary Regulations Are Not Usually Interpretive 
The APA provides no explanation of what it means by ―in-
terpretive.‖ In most circuits, therefore, an agency‘s assertion 
that a rule is interpretive rather than legislative is evaluated 
under the standard established by the D.C. Circuit in American 
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration.102 
The court‘s four-part test asks (1) ―whether in the absence of 
the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for en-
forcement action‖; (2) whether the rule has been published in 
the Code of Federal Regulations; (3) whether the agency used 
its general legislative authority to promulgate the rule; and (4) 
―whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule.‖103 
An affirmative answer to any of these inquiries establishes that 
the regulation has legal effect and should, therefore, be consid-
ered legislative and not interpretive.104 This test, while applied 
regularly to actions of other agencies, is rarely used to analyze 
Treasury regulations. Courts seem to resolve tax cases on other 
grounds or simply accept the Treasury‘s argument that a tem-
porary regulation is interpretive. This Note argues that this 
phenomenon should be attributed to tax exceptionalism and 
should persist no longer. 
To illustrate this point, take the recent tax case Beard v. 
Commissioner.105 Appealing from the Tax Court‘s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the taxpayers, the Commission-
 
 102. 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Intermountain Ins. Serv. of 
Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 241 (2010) rev’d on other grounds, 650 
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (Halpern & Holmes, 
JJ., concurring) (explaining that the American Mining test has become the 
―dominant standard‖ and has been adopted by at least six circuits (citing 1 
PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4, at 454 (5th ed. 2010))); APA 
Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1766. 
 103. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112. 
 104. See id. But see Health Ins. Ass‘n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 
423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the idea that publication in the Federal Regis-
ter is dispositive of whether a regulation is legislative or not); Cmty. Nutrition 
Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 105. 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). The 
temporary regulation in question was Temp. Treas. Reg.  
§ 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii) (1999). Id. at 623. 
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er of the IRS spent a good portion of the appellant brief recog-
nizing that ―[a]ppellees can be expected to argue that the regu-
lations are procedurally invalid for failure to satisfy the APA‘s 
notice-and-comment requirements‖106 and then detailing the 
IRS‘s position that the regulation was interpretive and there-
fore exempt.107 Rather than referencing the American Mining 
test, the Commissioner argued that any regulation promulgat-
ed by the Treasury in accordance with its general rulemaking 
authority granted by § 7805(a) should be considered interpre-
tive.108 Similarly, the brief cites two Seventh Circuit cases hold-
ing that regulations having a substantial impact on regulated 
parties or altering a party‘s rights are not necessarily legisla-
tive.109 The Court‘s opinion on this issue merely noted that 
―[m]uch ink has been spilled in the briefs‖ about the level of 
deference to grant to the temporary regulation at issue, but ―we 
need not reach this issue.‖110 Nevertheless, the Court did note 
that it would be inclined to ―grant the temporary regulation 
Chevron deference‖ whether it was interpretive or not, presum-
ably because the regulation later went through the notice-and-
comment process and was replaced by nearly identical final 
regulations.111  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Sev-
enth Circuit‘s judgment, and remanded the case for reconsider-
ation112 in light of its holding in Home Concrete.113 Admittedly, 
Beard was probably not the right case for an in-depth discus-
sion of the validity of temporary regulations. However, it would 
have been interesting if the Supreme Court had taken this op-
portunity to address the question of how to treat the interaction 
between the APA and temporary Treasury regulations in the 
wake of its Mayo decision. It could be argued that the case 
 
 106. Brief for the Appellant, Beard, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-
3741), 2010 WL 3950613, at *32. 
 107. Id. at 32–38. 
 108. Id. at 33 (citing Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003)). 
 109. Id. at 36 (citing Nat‘l Org. of Veterans‘ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec‘y of Vet-
erans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Metro. Sch. Dist. v. 
Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 110. Beard, 633 F.3d at 623. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Beard v. Comm‘r, 132 S. Ct. 2099, 2099 (2012). 
 113. See generally United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 132 S. 
Ct. 1836 (2012) (holding that the same Treasury regulation at issue in Beard 
was invalid and not entitled to Chevron deference because a prior Supreme 
Court case, Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), had found the statute 
in question unambiguous and provided the only binding interpretation). 
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would have turned out the same, with a remand to the lower 
court. In rejecting tax exceptionalism, the Supreme Court in 
Mayo stated that it was ―not inclined to carve out an approach 
to administrative review good for tax law only.‖114 By invalidat-
ing the Treasury‘s interpretation of a statute at Chevron step 
one,115 because congressional intent was clear as the statute 
was unambiguous on its face, the Seventh Circuit in Beard 
treated the Treasury the same as any other agency.116 On the 
other hand, if the Seventh Circuit had applied the American 
Mining test, it might have found that the regulation was proce-
durally invalid. The regulation at issue stated that an over-
statement of basis in ownership interests is an omission of in-
come, therefore, triggering a six-year statute of limitations.117 
Arguably, in the absence of this regulation there would not be 
an adequate legislative basis for enforcement since the default 
statute of limitations is only three years, making the regulation 
legislative under the first prong of the American Mining test. It 
follows, then, that as a legislative rule, the regulation is not ex-
empt from APA requirements and is procedurally invalid be-
cause it was not promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment 
procedures. This leads to the same end result, but would have 
sent a very different message to the Treasury—that tax excep-
tionalism will no longer be tolerated.118 
2. Treasury Claims of Good Cause Need Better Substantiation 
APA § 553 also provides an exemption from notice-and-
 
 114. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
55 (2011). 
 115. Chevron step one is questioning whether a ―statute is silent or ambig-
uous with respect to the specific issue‖ and if not, then to ―give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.‖ Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 116. Beard, 633 F.3d at 617. 
 117. See id. 
 118. This Note is not arguing that all temporary Treasury regulations 
should be considered legislative, but merely that with the Supreme Court‘s 
rejection of tax exceptionalism courts should judge the Treasury‘s actions un-
der the same level of review as that used with other agencies. As pointed out 
by Judges Halpern and Holmes, this means recognizing that ―the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) draws the line between legislative and other regula-
tions differently [than tax law].‖ Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. 
Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 240 (2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (citing 
Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in 
Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX 
LAW. 479, 484–85 (2008, rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012). 
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comment procedure for ―good cause.‖119 Like the interpretive 
exemption, agencies claim they have good cause for bypassing 
APA procedures on a regular basis. In fact, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that over an eight-year 
period, agencies used the ―good cause‖ exception for ―77 percent 
of major rules and 61 percent of nonmajor rules [published] 
without [a notice of proposed rulemaking],‖120 so the Treasury 
is certainly not alone when making such an assertion. Tax ex-
ceptionalism remains prevalent in the level of deference courts 
give to the Treasury‘s good cause claims despite the fact that 
such claims are often unsupported. 
The APA‘s only guidance on what is ―good cause‖ is to note 
that the exemption can be invoked when an agency finds that 
notice and comment would be ―impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.‖121 Given this lack of statutory 
guidance, courts often look to the Attorney General‘s Manual 
on the Administrative Procedure Act,122 which provides a fairly 
narrow interpretation of good cause but does give agencies 
some ―flexibility in dealing with emergencies and typographical 
errors, plus the occasional situation in which advance notice 
would be counterproductive.‖123 Most courts have become in-
creasingly skeptical of good cause claims and, therefore, have 
started demanding that an agency provide more than a cursory 
explanation of their need to skip notice and comment. For ex-
ample, in the D.C. Circuit case, Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Court came down hard on the 
EPA‘s attempt to invoke the good cause exemption to avoid 
APA procedures when promulgating an interim-final rule pro-
tecting a single noncompliant engine manufacturer.124 In its 
quite quotable opinion, the Court held that ―[w]e have repeat-
edly made clear that the good cause exception ‗is to be narrowly 
construed and only reluctantly countenanced‘‖125 and that ―the 
 
 119. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). 
 120. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 15 fig.5.  
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). 
 122. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S MANUAL ON THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S MANU-
AL]; see APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1759 n.119 (noting that the Attor-
ney General‘s Manual is ―generally regarded as an authoritative 
interpretation of the APA‖). 
 123. APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1782; see ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S 
MANUAL, supra note 122, at 30–31. 
 124. 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 125. Id. at 93 (quoting Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 
749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
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exceptions at issue here are not ‗escape clauses‘ that may be 
arbitrarily utilized at the agency‘s whim.‖126 In a similarly crit-
ical opinion, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held 
that ―[i]t is axiomatic that a mere recital of good cause does not 
create good cause. Similarly, a desire to provide immediate 
guidance, without more, does not suffice for good cause.‖127  
On the other hand, when the Treasury issues temporary 
regulations, it frequently gets by merely reciting the language 
suggested by the Internal Revenue Manual—―[t]hese regula-
tions are necessary to provide taxpayers with immediate guid-
ance. Accordingly, good cause is found for dispensing with no-
tice and public comment . . . .‖128 In the wake of Mayo, such 
cursory language should no longer suffice. Rejecting tax excep-
tionalism and applying the Mack Trucks or Mobil Oil opinions 
to any such Treasury regulation would likely lead to invalida-
tion of the temporary regulation for violating the APA and force 
the Treasury to provide a much more compelling and fact-
specific reason for its need to bypass APA procedures. 
C. SECTION 7805(E) DOES NOT TRUMP THE APA 
If the Mayo opinion weakens most Treasury claims of APA 
exemption for good cause or interpretive rules, what is left in 
the Treasury‘s arsenal? The most intriguing argument might 
be that in enacting § 7805(e) Congress intended to trump the 
APA and exempt all temporary regulations from notice-and-
comment procedure.129 In some sense, this is a much stronger 
argument for the Treasury because if a court were to adopt 
such a position, then the Treasury would not have to prove its 
regulation satisfied any of the enumerated APA exemptions. 
Rather, all temporary regulations would simply be beyond the 
 
 126. Id. (quoting Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 127. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep‘t of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 803 (Temp. Emer. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
 128. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 76, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1; see also 
APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1781 (―Several projects studied asserted 
good cause using only this language, or something closely resembling it.‖). 
 129. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellant at 6, Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. 
Comm‘r, 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2100 (2012), No. 09-
9015, 2010 WL 2397312 (―The provisions of § 7805(e) . . . show that Congress 
authorized Treasury to issue temporary regulations without notice and com-
ment . . . .‖); Respondent‘s Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Order and De-
cision at 20, Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211 
(2010), No. 25868-06, 2010 WL 6754791 (―Section 7805(e) provides a specific 
statutory exemption to the general statutory requirements of the APA.‖). 
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reach of notice-and-comment requirements. This is a dangerous 
road for courts to start down for three principal reasons.  
First, despite some views to the contrary,130 § 7805(e)‘s leg-
islative history does not support the assertion that § 7805(e) 
was enacted to free temporary tax regulations from all notice-
and-comment procedures, and APA § 559131 in particular 
should dispel such a claim. The Treasury‘s chief argument 
along these lines is that § 7805(e) conflicts with APA § 553 and 
in the face of such conflict ―a specific statute controls over a 
general one ‗without regard to priority of enactment.‘‖132 While 
the specific versus general distinction is generally true, the 
APA is specifically protected from such claims by APA § 559, 
which provides that a ―[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to 
supersede or modify this subchapter . . . except to the extent 
that it does so expressly.‖133 As Judges Halpern and Holmes 
put it, ―exceptions to the APA‘s terms cannot be inferred—
much less inferred from an absence in the legislative histo-
ry.‖134 Since nothing in the statutory language of § 7805(e), or 
in its sparse legislative history, even mentions the APA, it 
seems farfetched to claim that Congress expressly superseded 
or modified the APA by enacting § 7805(e).135 
 
 130. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellant, supra note 129, at 6 (arguing 
that the legislative history of § 7805(e) supports the assertion that ―Congress 
authorized [the] Treasury to issue temporary regulations without notice and 
comment by requiring any temporary regulation to be issued also as a pro-
posed regulation‖).  
 131. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012). 
 132. Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961) (quoting 
Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883)). 
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 559; see Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (artic-
ulating support for the express statement requirement created by APA § 559 
because ―[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation 
and diversity‖ and ―[i]t would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on 
the basis of a requirement ‗recognized‘ only as ambiguous‖). It is also worth 
noting that APA § 559 was last amended in 1978, so § 7805(e), which was add-
ed to the IRC in 1988, would qualify as a subsequent statute. 
 134. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 246 
(2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 
691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012). 
 135. Id. at 245; see Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 21, at 1054–58; 
see also Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 244 (―The legislative history does note that 
the Secretary [of the Treasury] commonly issued temporary regulations with 
immediate effect, but this alone hardly suggests Congress meant to waive no-
tice and comment for all temporary regulations.‖). But see Reply Brief for the 
Appellant, supra note 129, at 6–7 (asserting that the legislative history of 
§ 7805(e) does support such a position because it stated that Congress intend-
ed for the temporary nature of a regulation not to affect its validity if finalized 
in accordance with the three year sunset provision and arguing that ―[i]f the 
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Second, the APA and § 7805(e) can be interpreted to be 
complimentary rather than conflicting with one another. In a 
persuasive amicus brief, Professor Hickman urged the Court to 
hold that rather than authorizing the Treasury to forego notice-
and-comment procedures for all temporary regulations, 
§ 7805(e) actually imposes extra requirements.136 Such a coop-
erative reading essentially argues that if a regulation is exempt 
from APA rulemaking procedures under APA § 553, then the 
Treasury may issue the regulation in temporary form, but only 
if it also issues it in proposed form and finalizes it within three 
years as required by § 7805(e). The converse argument being, if 
the regulation is not exempt under APA § 553, then it cannot 
be issued in temporary form and § 7805(e) simply does not ap-
ply. Not only does this position resolve the argument that 
§ 7805(e) trumps the APA, for if the statutes are in harmony 
the Treasury can no longer claim that the specific trumps the 
general, but it also reconciles nicely with § 7805(e)‘s legislative 
history and is a step towards ending tax exceptionalism. One of 
the few things Congress noted when enacting § 7805(e) was 
that ―[t]he committee is also concerned about the length of time 
that some regulations remain in temporary form.‖137 If a tem-
porary Treasury regulation satisfies one of the APA § 553 ex-
emptions, then, strictly looking at the APA, it could remain on 
the books in temporary form indefinitely. Because the Treasury 
frequently asserts such exemptions, it makes sense that by 
adopting § 7805(e) and imposing the additional constraint that 
the Treasury must finalize every temporary regulation within 
three years of its promulgation,138 Congress was actually at-
tempting to force the Treasury to stop avoiding notice-and-
comment procedures.139 Furthermore, this cooperative inter-
pretation of the APA and § 7805(e) fits nicely into a post-Mayo 
administrative law world. It recognizes that the APA applies in 
full force to the Treasury just like any other agency and that 
courts do not have to ―carve out an approach to administrative 
 
absence of notice and comment could deprive temporary regulations of validi-
ty, then § 7805(e) would be meaningless, violating the canon of construction 
that ‗a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words‘‖ (quoting 
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995))). 
 136. Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 16, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 132 S. Ct. 1836 
(2012), No. 11-139, 2011 WL 6813230. 
 137. S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 7 (1988). 
 138. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e)(2) (2012). 
 139. See Brief of Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, supra note 136, at 18. 
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review good for tax law only.‖140  
Third, a court should consider the broader implications of 
interpreting § 7805(e) as overriding APA requirements for tem-
porary regulations. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, ―[t]he pur-
pose of notice-and-comment rulemaking is to ‗assure[] fairness 
and mature consideration of rules having a substantial impact 
on those regulated.‘‖141 Allowing the Treasury to skip notice-
and-comment procedures on all temporary regulations dilutes 
this purpose by allowing the exception to swallow the rule. It is 
also important to note that ―our system of taxation depends on 
a high degree of citizen ‗buy in.‘‖142 The IRS ―audits only a 
small percentage of the hundreds of millions of returns filed 
each year,‖143 so taxpayers who self-report are the primary 
source of government revenue. This revenue could be at risk 
because voluntary compliance could decline if taxpayers lose 
faith in the validity of Treasury regulations, especially if tax-
payers feel they have been deprived of the opportunity to com-
ment on and influence a regulation before it becomes binding. 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, therefore, gives legitimacy to 
Treasury actions and helps ensure future public participation.  
 
D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER FOR GRANDFATHERED  
TEMPORARY REGULATIONS 
Many of the arguments for finding current temporary regu-
lations procedurally invalid apply in full force against grandfa-
thered temporary tax regulations and might even be more per-
suasive in that context.144 For starters, any claim that § 7805(e) 
trumps APA § 553, thereby exempting Treasury regulations 
from notice and comment, must fail on its face. By definition, 
the grandfathered rules were promulgated before § 7805(e) was 
 
 140. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
55 (2011). 
 141. United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 931 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 645 F.2d 360, 371 (5th Cir. 
1981)); see also Asimow, supra note 8, at 366 (explaining the democratic pur-
poses of notice-and-comment procedures by commenting ―the undemocratic 
power of rulemaking is alleviated by allowing the persons affected to have a 
say about the rules and by requiring the agency to read and respond to their 
comments‖). 
 142. Johnson, supra note 50, at 290–91. 
 143. Id. at 291. 
 144. See Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 21, at 1057 (―Many tempo-
rary regulations issued prior to November 21, 1988, are likely now invalid be-
cause of the Treasury‘s failure to allow the public to comment on them.‖). 
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enacted, and as § 7805(e) was given only prospective applica-
tion it cannot be an argument here. That leaves the Treasury 
with the classic APA exceptions. Admittedly, there might be 
some grandfathered temporary tax regulations that would 
properly qualify for an interpretive rule or good cause exemp-
tion, but it is equally likely that courts at that time merely de-
ferred to the Treasury‘s assertions that it had complied with 
the APA. For example, in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Com-
missioner, the court dealt with a grandfathered temporary reg-
ulation enforced against a taxpayer more than ten years after it 
was promulgated.145 The appellee argued that there would be 
no jurisdiction for the case but for the invocation of the proce-
durally invalid temporary regulation.146 If such an assertion is 
true, then it appears that the first prong of the American Min-
ing test could be used to argue that the temporary regulation 
was legislative because in its absence ―there would not be an 
adequate legislative basis for enforcement action.‖147 Similarly, 
in enacting Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6233-1T, the 
Treasury did not include a contemporaneous assertion of good 
cause or explain its reasoning with any specificity, but simply 
cited its need to provide ―immediate guidance to partners and 
partnerships affected and to the Internal Revenue Service in 
the conduct of partnership examinations.‖148 In the wake of 
Mayo, a mere reference to immediate guidance likely would be 
insufficient to qualify for the good cause exemption. Likewise, it 
should be noted that a claim of immediate guidance seems 
much less compelling more than a decade after a rule‘s promul-
gation.  
Throughout this Part, this Note argues that, despite the 
Supreme Court‘s holding in Mayo, tax exceptionalism is still 
alive and well in the temporary Treasury regulation context. 
Despite the Treasury‘s frequent claim that it uses temporary 
regulations to provide immediate guidance, the practice only 
causes more confusion as it clashes with Supreme Court prece-
dent and generally applicable administrative procedures. This 
Note does not suggest that the Treasury must use notice-and-
comment procedures every time it acts, rather, it argues that 
 
 145. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 146. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 5. 
 147. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 148. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 8–9 (quoting Mis-
cellaneous Provisions Relating to the Tax Treatment of Partnership Items, 52 
Fed. Reg. 6779, 6780 (Mar. 5, 1987)). 
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the Treasury should no longer receive special treatment from 
the judicial system.  
III.  SOLUTION: ENDING TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
SURROUNDING TEMPORARY TREASURY REGULATIONS   
The Treasury must comply with the APA like any other 
agency, but the question now becomes how to get it to comply 
without destabilizing the tax system. This Note suggests that 
judicial or congressional action is needed to finally end the tax 
exceptionalism practices surrounding temporary Treasury reg-
ulations. Section A briefly addresses why maintaining the sta-
tus quo or immediately invalidating all temporary regulations 
are not practical solutions. Section B then proposes potential 
avenues courts and Congress can take to bring the Treasury 
back in line with APA mandated procedures.  
 A. EXTREME SOLUTIONS ARE NOT THE ANSWER 
If Mayo rejected tax exceptionalism almost four years ago, 
why is the Treasury not treated like any other agency by now? 
One answer might be that changing precedent through the 
court system is a slow process, but in the case of tax exception-
alism other factors are in play. For starters, based on current 
trends, the issue is simply not in front of courts enough to re-
sult in any real impact.149 Then, even if the procedural invalidi-
ty of a regulation makes it into a taxpayer‘s brief, it is usually 
one of numerous alternative arguments and rarely gets much 
discussion by the court.150 Additionally, the Treasury has little 
incentive to change its practices. In the current administrative 
law climate, temporary regulations promulgated without no-
tice-and-comment procedures are treated as binding on taxpay-
ers, so the added enforcement benefit of complying with the 
APA is basically nonexistent. It is most likely true that the 
Treasury does not avoid such administrative procedure out of 
 
 149. For a discussion of why such cases rarely make it to the courts, see 
supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; see also Problem of Remedy, supra 
note 66, at 1157 (―In other words, statutory provisions and the courts‘ own ju-
risprudence combined discourage procedural challenges against Treasury reg-
ulations to the point of denying taxpayers an adequate judicial remedy to vin-
dicate procedural rights granted in the APA.‖). 
 150. Compare Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106 (arguing extensively 
against procedural invalidity), with Beard v. Comm‘r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 
2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (dedicating only one cursory paragraph 
to the issue and deciding the case on other grounds). 
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some conniving or malicious intent,151 but, just like any other 
agency, it would rather not use its limited resources on APA 
compliance if it does not have to.152 Therefore, if no action is 
taken by the courts or judiciary, the Treasury will likely main-
tain the status quo, which leaves all temporary regulations 
binding on taxpayers despite their noncompliance with the 
APA.  
At the other extreme, any Supreme Court or congressional 
action that simply declares that all temporary Treasury regula-
tions are invalid would be a similarly poor solution. Taxpayers 
rely heavily on the stability of the Code for planning purposes 
and fully expect that the Treasury regulations on the books are, 
at a minimum, reliable guidance. The instability that would be 
caused by such invalidation could be detrimental to the tax sys-
tem both because it could alienate taxpayers, potentially reduc-
ing voluntary compliance and therefore revenue, and because it 
would compel the Treasury to hurriedly fill the gaps in tax law 
previously dealt with by such regulations.153 A declaration that 
temporary regulations are invalid could also implicate the va-
lidity of regulations originally issued in temporary form, but 
later finalized with post-promulgation notice and comment.154 
Furthermore, such action would be hard to reconcile with the 
legislative history of § 7805(e), which specifically notes that 
―[t]he expiration of temporary regulations at the end of this 
[three]-year period is not to affect the validity of those regula-
tions during the [three]-year period.‖155 Given the problems 
with these solutions, it is clear that another approach is neces-
sary.  
 
 151. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1799 (―APA noncompliance [is] 
the unanticipated and unintended consequence of the well-intentioned pursuit 
of alternative priorities.‖). 
 152. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX 
NOTES 1251, 1264 (2011) (―For temporary regulations issued after the effective 
date of section 7805(e), the IRS generally attempts to issue final versions be-
fore the end of the three-year expiration period. However, there appears to be 
no corresponding effort to issue final versions of the older temporary regula-
tions.‖). 
 153. See Asimow, supra note 8, at 373. 
 154. See Force of Law, supra note 33, at 471 (―But if the temporary regula-
tions were procedurally defective, at least some courts may feel bound to find 
final regulations with temporary origins to be similarly invalid.‖). 
 155. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 218 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). The original Sen-
ate Report called for a two-year sunset provision, which was later changed to 
three years by the conference agreement. Id. 
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B. RECOGNIZING THAT TAX EXCEPTIONALISM IS DEAD 
Rejecting the two extremes—maintaining the status quo 
and affirming all temporary regulations or invalidating all 
temporary regulations—still leaves some more balanced ap-
proaches that could be used to transition the Treasury away 
from tax exceptionalism and back to APA compliance. Rather 
than proposing one solution, this Note suggests several options 
that could be used alone or in tandem with each other.  
First, courts could simply be less deferential to unsupport-
ed Treasury claims that any given temporary regulation is ex-
empt from APA procedure. The invalidation of even a few tem-
porary regulations accompanied by a judicial opinion explicitly 
noting the lack of substantiation for avoiding notice and com-
ment could be the push the Treasury needs to start supporting 
its exemption assertions with specificity and particularity like 
other agencies. The Treasury does not want to go through all 
the work of promulgating a temporary regulation just to have it 
invalidated.156 Once the Treasury realizes that courts will no 
longer be satisfied by an assertion of ―the need for immediate 
guidance,‖ it should have sufficient motivation to change and 
maybe even update the Internal Revenue Manual. Two down-
falls of this approach are that it could prove slow and would on-
ly be effective if implemented consistently. Courts can only take 
such a position if they hear cases properly raising the issue 
and, currently, such cases are few and far between.157 To 
achieve the most expansive results with this approach, it would 
be best for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a relevant 
case, hold that the temporary regulation in question is invalid, 
and articulate that the regulation would have been legally 
binding if promulgated in accordance with the APA or if an ex-
ception from the APA had been properly invoked. Then lower 
courts could follow suit and cite the Supreme Court case as 
binding precedent. 
Second, courts could adopt the position suggested in Pro-
fessor Hickman‘s amicus brief to Home Concrete158 and explicit-
ly hold that requirements imposed by § 7805(e) are additions, 
not alternatives, to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
 
 156. C.f. Force of Law, supra note 33, at 533 (―By the time that it issues 
proposed regulations, Treasury has already accomplished much of the work of 
promulgating final regulations.‖). 
 157. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, supra note 136, at 15–19. 
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cedures for the Treasury. Alone or paired with the first sugges-
tion, this could be an effective means of increasing Treasury 
compliance with the APA. It still allows the Treasury to prom-
ulgate temporary regulations, just like any other agency, but 
only when it possesses valid and persuasive reasons for doing 
so. Additionally, it addresses congressional concerns about the 
length of time Treasury regulations remain temporary by reaf-
firming the three-year sunset provision of § 7805(e)(2). Howev-
er, like the first solution, this option suffers from the need for 
the right case to be brought before the courts. 
Third, courts could embrace what the Seventh Circuit 
hinted at in Kikalos v. Commissioner—that procedurally inva-
lid temporary regulations should be ―entitled to no more defer-
ence than a proposed regulation.‖159 Standing alone, this sug-
gestion would encourage the Treasury to become more 
administratively compliant, because it establishes a bright-line 
test between what would be legally binding on taxpayers and 
what would be deemed unenforceable guidance. After applica-
tion by a few courts, the Treasury would understand that to be 
given the force of law by courts a regulation must be promul-
gated in accordance with the APA. Paired with the first two so-
lutions, this option is also a good alternative to hasty invalida-
tion of all temporary regulations. It would allow temporary 
regulations that have not gone through full notice-and-
comment procedure and that do not otherwise properly qualify 
for an APA § 553 exemption to still be used as guidance, but 
not to be negatively invoked against a taxpayer. In essence, 
they would have the same power as a proposed regulation or 
other informal IRS guidance and any penalties imposed by 
them would be unenforceable until post-promulgation notice-
and-comment procedures were completed.160 By adopting this 
position, courts would also incentivize the Treasury to use APA 
procedures on a more frequent basis for any temporary regula-
tion it intends to be legally binding. Again, this option would be 
most effective if adopted in a Supreme Court opinion, so as to 
prevent inconsistent application by lower courts, which would 
cause more confusion than it would resolve. 
 
 159. 190 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 160. Concerns about the validity of regulations made final only through 
post-promulgation are beyond the scope of this Note, but see Ford, supra note 
56, at 836 n.265 (―[T]he promulgation of temporary regulations concurrent 
with notices of proposed rulemaking violates the APA, because post-
promulgation notice-and-comment is not a valid substitute for statutorily re-
quired pre-promulgation notice-and-comment.‖). 
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Fourth, a more sweeping possibility would be for Congress 
to amend the APA to include a section explicitly detailing its 
position on interim and temporary regulations. The Treasury is 
not the only agency increasing its use of temporary regula-
tions,161 so additional congressional guidance might be war-
ranted for all agencies. Such a provision could speak to the 
amount of deference courts should grant to interim rules, could 
impose an expiration period for temporary regulations similar 
to the one imposed by § 7805(e), or could address the validity of 
only using post-promulgation notice-and-comment procedures. 
The benefit of this solution is that its effect could be far-
reaching and it would resolve many issues currently plaguing 
the courts. However, the problem with this option is that con-
gressional action takes time. Unlike the gradual, but immedi-
ate, change that could be achieved through judicial action, if 
Congress tried to implement new policies, the tax community 
might not see any change for a few years.162  
Finally, to deal with any outstanding grandfathered tem-
porary regulations, this Note proposes two alternative options. 
Courts could apply the same degree of deference discussed in 
the third solution—deference equivalent to that accorded to 
proposed regulations—or Congress could add to § 7805(e) and 
invoke a sunset provision for grandfathered regulations. The 
latter option could mimic § 7805(e) and explicitly state that any 
temporary regulation issued prior to November 22, 1988 will 
expire within three years. The goal being to give the Treasury 
time to finalize through notice and comment any regulations it 
desires to continue to enforce and to give taxpayers time to ad-
just their plans accordingly.  
While any of these solutions alone would be a step towards 
the end of tax exceptionalism, this Note suggests that a combi-
nation of the first three proposals would be the most effective in 
bringing the Treasury in line with the APA without destabiliz-
ing the tax system and, importantly, could be plausibly imple-
mented. By applying the first suggestion and refusing to give 
deference to unsubstantiated claims of exemption from the 
APA, courts would push the Treasury to act like other agencies 
 
 161. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 42 fig.10. 
 162. C.f. Independence Hall Association, How a Bill Becomes a Law, 
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/6e.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015) (explaining that ―less that [sic] 10% of proposed bills actually become 
laws‖ and that ―[m]any people criticize Congress for its inefficiency and the 
length of time that it takes for laws to be passed and enacted,‖ but also noting 
that such a lengthy process is intentional and allows for proper deliberation).  
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and articulate its need to bypass notice-and-comment proce-
dures. This in turn would make it easier for courts to determine 
if a regulation is properly exempt. If so, then a court could ap-
ply the second suggestion and require the Treasury to also 
comply with § 7805(e). If not, or if the Treasury failed to satisfy 
the requirements of § 7805(e), then a court can apply the third 
suggestion and hold that the regulation at issue is unenforcea-
ble against a taxpayer, but may nonetheless still represent val-
uable guidance. Even if the lower courts are slightly incon-
sistent in their application, if they adopt any combination of 
these three approaches, the Treasury will be forced to become 
more administratively compliant to ensure its temporary regu-
lations are legally binding. Together these approaches also pro-
vide stability to the tax system because they would be imple-
mented gradually, one temporary regulation at a time, as cases 
are raised before the courts. Thus, they would allow taxpayers 
and the IRS sufficient time to adapt, unlike the fourth option—
congressional action—which might lead to an abrupt system-
wide change and leave taxpayers scrambling to adjust. Addi-
tionally, with proper education of taxpayers and lawyers about 
the availability of the argument of procedural invalidity, we 
should see more cases where courts could actually implement 
this change. While these suggestions may not end all instances 
of tax exceptionalism, at the very least they should push the 
Treasury in the desired direction of being more compliant with 
the APA.  
  CONCLUSION   
Despite the Supreme Court‘s rejection of tax exceptional-
ism, the belief that tax should be afforded special treatment 
remains prevalent, especially in Treasury practices and court 
decisions surrounding temporary tax regulations. With few 
cases challenging the validity of temporary regulations and 
even fewer courts tackling the issue head on, this problem is 
likely to persist. As long as the judicial system continues to al-
low the Treasury to operate in its own administrative environ-
ment, making conclusory assertions of good cause and claiming 
statutory exemption from APA procedure for all temporary 
regulations, the Treasury has no incentive to change its ways.  
Therefore, taxpayers and the courts should take a stance 
against tax exceptionalism. Taxpayers need to raise claims as-
serting that temporary regulations promulgated without notice-
and-comment procedures should no longer be legally binding. 
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Then courts can insist on proper substantiation, require a com-
plementary reading of § 7805(e) and APA § 553, and give little 
deference to noncompliant regulations. Such judicial action will 
force the Treasury to bring temporary regulations back in line 
with the Administrative Procedure Act.  
 
